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Appendix B: The New Area-Wide Model Abstract
Despite intense calls for safeguarding public investment in Europe, public invest-
ment expenditure, when measured in relation to GDP, has steadily fallen in the last
three decades, evoking fears that economic activity may be correspondingly negatively
a⁄ected. At the same time, however, public consumption in the EU-12 countries has
trended up. In this paper, we provide a macroeconomic assessment of the observed
change in the composition of public spending in the euro area in a medium-scale two-
country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model.
First, we analyze the channels through which, both temporary and permanent public
investment shocks generate larger ￿scal multipliers than exogenous increases in public
consumption. Furthermore, we quantify the negative impact of a change in ￿scal stance,
characterized by a permanent rise in public consumption and a permanent fall in public
investment, keeping thereby the overall level of public spending constant. The key
message of the paper is that calls for reversing the observed trend in the composition
of public spending are well justi￿ed.
JEL Classi￿cation Numbers: F41, F42
Keywords: Public investment, Public consumption, Euro Area, DSGE models.
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This paper analyzes the macroeconomic e⁄ects of the observed change in the composi-
tion of public spending in the European Union (EU) since the 1970s￿ characterized by a
continuous fall in public investment and a corresponding rise in public consumption when
measured as shares of GDP￿ and concludes that calls for safeguarding public investment
are well justi￿ed.
The paper is motivated by recent debates in the EU about the relative e⁄ectiveness of
public consumption versus public investment as demand management tools. In particular,
the debate has focused on the veracity of the underlying hypothesis that public investment
is a relatively more potent instrument of ￿scal policy than public consumption. If this were
true￿ a notion that seems to be well espoused by the European Commission￿ then ￿scal
consolidation strategies in EU countries should preferably not be implemented by cutting
back on public investment because the latter generates higher rates of return than projects
related to public consumption.
Although there is a substantial empirical literature that attempt to identify the sources
of these developments, there is still a lack of understanding of the nature and the impact
of a change in the composition of public spending. Furthermore, the empirical literature
is inconclusive, which type of public spending has a stronger impact on macroeconomic
activity. In that sense, the paper attempts to ￿ll this void by providing a comparative
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the relative strength of public consumption and
public investment expenditures in in￿ uencing macroeconomic conditions in the short- and
long-term, and by analyzing a policy scenario which accounts for the observed paths of
public consumption and public investment in recent decades.
Methodologically, the paper sheds some light on these issues from a DSGE perspective by
employing a version of the New Area-Wide Model, modi￿ed to include separate and distinct
roles for public consumption and public investment, which allows studying the economic
implications of temporary and permanent shocks to the share of public consumption and
public investment in GDP.
The main result of the paper is that both temporary and permanent increases in public
investment generate larger ￿scal multipliers than those from increases in public consump-
tion. Public investment not only increases aggregate demand, but it also raises aggregate
supply by enhancing aggregate production and the marginal productivity of labor and pri-
vate capital. As a result, the negative wealth e⁄ect associated with increases in public
spending is ameliorated in the case of public investment. This leads to a smaller decrease
or even increase in private consumption, depending on the productivity of public capital.
The same logic applies to private investment and output￿ as public capital builds up, the
productivity of private capital improves, causing a rise in private investment and output.
Furthermore, the results show that recent change in composition in public spending
could potentially have deleterious e⁄ects on economic activity. In particular, keeping the
overall level of public spending in the model constant, the results indicate that a permanent
rise in public consumption is not su¢ cient to unwind the adverse e⁄ects of a permanent
fall in public investment. In this sense, the key message of the paper is that the calls for
safeguarding public investment in EU are not without merit, and the observed change in
the composition of public spending might be deleterious for long-run growth.
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While ￿scal policy is one of the two main policy tools used by governments to a⁄ect macro-
economic conditions within countries, it is generally believed that nowadays authorities
remain less engaged in ￿scal activism compared to the golden days of Keynesian policy in
the 50s and 60s. Nevertheless, it is also accepted that quite often policy makers seem sym-
pathetic to the view of stimulating aggregate demand through increased spending. Policy
makers in Europe also actively participate in this debate, which is evidenced by the recent
study undertaken by the European Commission (2003) related to the determinants of public
investment and the relative e⁄ectiveness of public consumption versus public investment as
demand management tools.
The above captioned study reveals that, at the policy level in Europe, it is almost
an article of faith that, abstracting from distributional issues, public investment is a more
superior type of spending than public consumption. For example, the recent o¢ cial review of
public ￿nances in Europe by the European Commission (see European Commission (2003),
p.28) clearly suggests that any "...budgetary consolidation strategy, based on expenditure
restraint, should not be achieved at the expense of the most ￿ productive￿components of
public spending (such as public investment, education and research expenditures)." As a
result, proposals to shield public investment from the rules of the Stability and Growth
Pact have gained considerable currency.
Such proposals seem to be well justi￿ed in the face of the observed temporal evolution
of public investment in the EU-12 countries. When measured in relation to GDP, average
public investment has steadily fallen in the last three decades evoking fears that economic
activity may be correspondingly negatively a⁄ected by this phenomenon. At the same
time, however, public consumption in the EU-12 countries has trended up. Therefore, policy
makers in Europe might be interested in ￿nding out what could be the policy implications of
the diverse temporal evolution of the two main elements of public spending. In this sense,
the main purpose of our study is to provide a comparative qualitative and quantitative
analysis of the relative strength of public consumption and public investment expenditures
in in￿ uencing macroeconomic conditions in the short- and long-term, and to analyze a
policy scenario which accounts for the observed paths of public consumption and public
investment over the last thirty years. To this end, we employ a version of the New Area-
Wide Model (NAWM) as discussed in Coenen, McAdam and Straub (2007), augmented
to include separate and distinctive roles for public consumption and public investment, to
investigate the economic e⁄ects of temporary and permanent shocks to the share of public
consumption and public investment in GDP.
The NAWM is particularly suited to studying the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy as it departs
from a central tenet of most DSGE models. It breaks down the Ricardian equivalence
by introducing two types of households￿ one that can fully participate in assets markets
and another that is limited in its ability to smooth consumption intertemporally1. This,
along with the presence of distortionary taxes, allows for a more realistic treatment of ￿scal
policy in the model. Moreover, crucially for the analysis in the paper, we distinguish in the
model between public consumption spending and public investment spending. In particular,
we assume that public capital is an essential ingredient in the production function of the
individual private ￿rm. In contrast, spending on public consumption a⁄ects aggregate
demand without enhancing the productivity of the private production sector.
1See Gal￿, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007) and Bilbiie and Straub (2005) for an analysis of the interaction
of rule-of-thumb agents and the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy.
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investment generate larger ￿scal multipliers than those from increases in public consump-
tion. Public investment not only increases aggregate demand, but it also raises aggregate
supply by enhancing aggregate production and the marginal productivity of labor and pri-
vate capital. As a result, the negative wealth e⁄ect associated with increases in public
spending is ameliorated in the case of public investment. This leads to a smaller decrease
or even increase in private consumption, depending on the productivity of public capital.
The same logic applies to private investment and output￿ as public capital builds up, the
productivity of private capital improves, causing a rise in private investment and output.
Furthermore, our results show that recent change in composition in public spending has
potentially deleterious e⁄ects on economic activity in the euro area. In particular, keeping
the overall level of public spending in Europe constant, the results indicate that a permanent
rise in public consumption is not su¢ cient to unwind the adverse e⁄ects of a permanent
fall in public investment. In this sense, the key message of the paper is that the calls for
safeguarding public investment in Europe are not without merit.
The remainder of the paper is as follow. Section 2 brie￿ y reviews the evolution of public
investment and public consumption in the EU-12. Section 3 summarizes the literature on
the e⁄ects of public investment on economic activity. Section 4 provides a short description
of the model and the calibration. Section 5 explains the results from the temporary shocks.
Section 6 analyzes the results from the policy scenario and the permanent shocks. Section
7 concludes.
2 Public Investment and Public Consumption in the Euro
Area
This section reviews the temporal evolution of public investment and public consumption
in the EU-12 countries and provides some explanations for the observed downward trend.
Figure 1 traces out the trend in public investment in the EU-12 countries since the 1970s.
It is evident that public investment fell from about 4.2 percent of GDP in the beginning
of the 1970s to below 3 percent of GDP in 20052. While the general trend does point out
to reduced rates of accumulation of public capital, there is a considerable variation across
individual countries. Austria, Belgium and Germany have experienced the largest declines,
with the share of public investment in GDP falling from about 5 to slightly above 1 percent.
The fall in public investment has been less pronounced in Finland, France, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands and Portugal. In contrast, in Luxembourg3 and Spain the share of public
investment in GDP has in fact increased.
In addition, there are interesting developments within individual countries. For example,
while public investment in Ireland dropped from about 6 percent of GDP in 1974 to 1.8
percent of GDP at the end of the 1980s, it subsequently rose to about 4 percent of GDP at
the turn of the century. Similar, but less pronounced, evolution can be observed in Italy,
where public investment fell to 2.1 percent of GDP in 1995, but later on accelerated to its
long-term average of 3 percent of GDP.
It would also be useful to see what implications, if any, the decrease in public investment
has had on public capital. Kamps (2004) provides new estimates of public capital stock
2Public investment is computed as unweighted average of government ￿xed capital formation across the
EU-12 countries. Euro area data shows that public investment was 2.5 percent in GDP in 2005.
3For Luxembourg, data is available only from 1990.
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￿vefold in Portugal, fourfold in Spain, threefold in Belgium and Finland, more than doubled
in Greece and Ireland, doubled in Austria, France, Germany and Italy, and less than doubled
in Netherlands. The downtrend in public investment-to-GDP ratio has, therefore, not been
large enough to force public investment below the level of depreciation. While the level of
accumulation of public capital has slowed down in line with the decline in public investment,
the stock of public capital in the EU-12 countries has continued to grow.
The above description of the evolution of public investment ￿ ows raises two important
questions. First, what created the observed patterns, especially the long-term downtrend in
public investment. Second, what are the consequences of this pattern, especially in terms
of economic growth. We address the latter question in the next section, and focus on the
former below.
There have been a number of explanations as to what might account for the observed
decline in public investment in the EU-12 countries. The most commonly advanced are the
extensive privatization and the drive toward a smaller economic role for the state in the
past three decades; the emergence of alternative ways to ￿nance infrastructure investment,
such as the public-private partnerships; the impact of EMU￿ s ￿scal rules; and a decreasing
need for additional infrastructure.
There are only few studies5 devoted to the testing of these hypotheses and, moreover,
they do not o⁄er comprehensive and concluding evidence of why public investment has
trended down for so long. In a recent econometric study, however, Valila and Mehrotra
(2005) evaluate the above competing hypotheses and reach the conclusion that the long-term
downtrend in public investment is associated with drawn-out episodes of ￿scal consolidation,
unrelated to EMU. In other words, public investment is one of the many ￿scal policy tools
used to curtail budgetary de￿cits. Speci￿cally, the authors ￿nd no evidence that the ￿scal
rules embodied in the EMU could have accounted for the downtrend, nor do they ￿nd
support for the hypothesis that the demand for public capital has reached a saturation
point. In addition, they argue that it is unlikely that any political drive toward a smaller
economic role for the state can account for the decline in public investment as, if measured in
terms of tax revenue to GDP, governments have not become less signi￿cant in recent decades.
Finally, public-private partnerships are a relatively recent phenomenon and, moreover, they
have become signi￿cant only in a few EU-12 countries6.
The temporal evolution of public consumption over the last three decades di⁄ers from
that of public investment. Figure 2 shows the average public consumption increased from
14.8 percent in GDP in 1970 to 20 percent of GDP in 2005. Public consumption accelerated
signi￿cantly relative to GDP in the 70s and the 80s when the bulk of this increase took
place. The growth di⁄erential between public consumption and GDP was smaller in the 90s
and the beginning of the century, when the share of public consumption in GDP grew only
modestly. This pattern is relatively uniform across Euro Area countries, with the notable
exception of Ireland, where the share of public consumption in GDP was on a downward
path in the 90s.
This combined behavior of public investment and public consumption in the EU-12
countries motivates the policy scenario that we investigate using the NAWM.
4These include all EU-12 countries, but Luxembourg.
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In this section we go on to review the empirical literature with a view to analyzing whether
the decline in public investment has a detrimental impact on economic growth at the ag-
gregate level.
The possibility that a declining share of public investment in GDP could have deleteri-
ous consequences for economic growth over the long term is a legitimate cause for concern,
although the empirical evidence in this area remains mixed7. There are a number of rea-
sons why the many studies on this topic fail to uncover a conclusive positive impact of
public investment on growth. These include: (i) the di¢ culty in controlling for all the
factors, in addition to public investment, that a⁄ect growth over the long term; (ii) the
fact that a sizable portion of public investment is directed to supporting broad functions of
government, including redistribution and the provision of public services, maintaining law
and order, and administration, which do not directly boost productive potential; (iii) the
lumpy nature of infrastructure investment which implies that the full impact of investment
in roads, telecommunications, and other infrastructure on growth can only be realized with
considerable lags, once e⁄ective networks have been established.
The precursor of these studies is Aschauer, who in a series of papers published in 1989,
suggested that falling public investment in the United States can help explain the post-1970
slowdown in U.S. productivity growth. A number of subsequent studies reached similar
conclusions, although the strength and robustness of such results turn out to be sensitive
to the methodology and data employed.
There are four methodologies that have traditionally been used: (i) aggregate production
functions, which relate output to public capital stock; (ii) cost or pro￿t functions, to assess
whether public capital lowers business costs; (iii) research focused on growth rather than
the level of output, examining whether public investment helps explain di⁄erences in cross-
country or cross-regional growth; (iv) VARs, which are suited to exploiting the time-series
properties of public investment.
Considering the links between public capital and output, many studies￿ but not all￿ ￿nd
a positive association between these variables. However, pointing to a range of econometric
problems arising with such studies, Gramlich (1994) and others have noted that the implied
rates of return of public capital in many of these studies appear to be implausibly high.
Interestingly, while the work of Aschauer and others was originally motivated by the post-
1970 slowdown in U.S. productivity growth, the latter picked up signi￿cantly during the
1990s while public investment continued to decline.
Most of the studies using cost or pro￿t functions ￿nd that public capital does lower
business costs or increases pro￿ts, although the magnitude of these a⁄ects is relatively
small.
In a number of studies focusing on the level and growth of output, empirical support
for a positive impact of public capital has been obtained using a particular component
of investment￿ notably infrastructure. For example, Calderon and Serven (2003) show that
quantitative measures of road and rail lines have a positive and signi￿cant impact on output
per worker. Growth regressions also emphasize the role of infrastructure. Easterly and
Rebelo (1993) ￿nd that aggregate public investment does not appear to be a signi￿cant
determinant of per capital growth, but they do ￿nd a strong positive impact associated
with public investment in transportation and communication.
7For a detailed overview of the literature, see IMF (2004), and Romp and de Haan (2005).
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establish the direction of causation. The results produced by this strain of literature are
inconclusive. Perotti (2004) explicitly compares public consumption and public investment
multipliers and ￿nds that the latter are not more e⁄ective than the former in boosting
GDP both in the short- and long-run. In addition, he does not ￿nd evidence that public
investment pays for itself in the long run as the proponents of the "Golden Rule" have
argued.
In general, the lack of clear-cut results may not be surprising. Empirical work is com-
plicated by data issues that have to be borne in mind. First, the usual de￿nition of public
investment￿ government gross ￿xed capital formation￿ is somewhat narrow in the sense that
it does not cover all public spending that adds to a country￿ s productive potential. Current
spending on education and health which clearly enhances human capital is a notable missing
element. Second, net public investment is the proper indicator of additions to the public
capital stock, but data on gross data are more readily available. Third, the data on public
capital stock, either in ￿nancial or physical terms, would be better for analytical purposes,
but they are used only in few studies (although those that produce the strongest positive
results).
In this paper we address the issue of public investment in a theoretical model. There are
very few papers that explicitly analyze the impact of government investment on macoreco-
nomic dynamics in a microfounded DSGE model. Notable exceptions are Pappa (2004) and
Kumhof and Laxton (2007). However, while in the former the focus is the transmission of
￿scal shocks to labor markets, the latter investigates the relationship between government
investment and monetary policy.
4 The Framework
In the following sections, we outline the features of the baseline NAWM model, as discussed
in Coenen, McAdam and Straub (2007), and highlight the changes we have introduced to
conducting our analysis8. Finally, we also present the calibration of the model.
4.1 The Model
The NAWM builds on recent advances in developing micro-founded Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) models suitable for quantitative policy analysis, as exempli-
￿ed by the closed-economy model of the euro area by Smets and Wouters (2003), the Inter-
national Monetary Fund￿ s Global Economy Model (GEM; cf. Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti,
2004) or the Federal Reserve Board￿ s new open economy model named SIGMA (cf. Erceg,
Guerrieri and Gust, 2005). Thus, it incorporates a relatively large number of nominal and
real frictions in an e⁄ort to improve its empirical ￿t regarding both the domestic and the
international dimension.
The baseline version of the NAWM consists of two symmetric countries of di⁄erent size:
the euro area and the United States, the latter representing the rest of the industrialized
world. International linkages arise from the trade of goods and international assets, allow-
ing for imperfect exchange-rate pass-through and imperfect risk sharing. In each country,
there are four types of economic agents: households, ￿rms, a ￿scal and a monetary author-
ity. Extending the setup in Coenen and Straub (2005), the NAWM features two distinct
8We describe the model in full in Appendix A.
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kets, with one type of household only holding money as opposed to also trading bonds
and accumulating physical capital. As a result, also households with limited ability to ac-
cess asset markets can intertemporally smooth consumption by adjusting their holdings of
money. Due to the existence of these two types of households, ￿scal policies other than
government spending￿ notably transfers￿ also have real e⁄ects even though both types of
households are optimizing subject to intertemporal budget constraints. Further, it is as-
sumed that both types of households supply di⁄erentiated labour services and act as wage
setters in monopolistically competitive markets by charging a markup over their marginal
rate of substitution. Speci￿cally, wage setting is characterized by sticky nominal wages and
indexation, eventually resulting in two separate wage Phillips curves.
In calibrating the behavior of the two types of households, we set the size of the group
of households with limited ability to participate in asset markets to one-fourth, in line with
the estimates reported in Coenen and Straub (2005), while all other structural parameters
are assumed to be identical across households. Moreover, in order to establish a more pro-
nounced role of transfer payments made by the ￿scal authority, we assume that transfers, in
per-capita terms, are unevenly distributed across the two types of households, favouring the
constrained households with limited asset-market participation over the unconstrained ones
in a proportion of three to one. This also helps to guarantee that the levels of consumption
and hours worked are not too dissimilar across households.
Regarding ￿rms, the NAWM distinguishes between producers of tradable di⁄erentiated
intermediate goods and producers of three non-tradable ￿nal goods: a private consumption
good, a private investment good, and a public consumption good. The intermediate-good
producers sell their di⁄erentiated outputs in both domestic and foreign markets under mo-
nopolistic competition, while the ￿nal-good producers operate under perfect competition
and take prices as given. It is assumed that the intermediate-good producers set di⁄erent
prices in domestic and foreign markets, by charging a markup over marginal cost but pricing
in local currency. In both markets, there is sluggish price adjustment due to staggered price
contracts and indexation, yielding two separate price Phillips curves.
The ￿scal authority purchases units of the public consumption good and makes transfer
payments to the two types of households, in unevenly distributed amounts. These expenses
are ￿nanced by di⁄erent types of distortionary taxes, including taxes on consumption spend-
ing, labour and capital income, as well as pro￿ts. A simple feedback rule is assumed to
stabilize the government debt-to-output ratio by appropriately adjusting a suitable ￿scal
instrument.
Finally, the monetary authority is assumed to follow an inertial Taylor-type interest-
rate rule with interest-rate smoothing, which is speci￿ed in terms of annual consumer-price
in￿ ation and quarterly output growth.
4.2 Changes to the Baseline Model
Here we brie￿ y outline only those equations of the model that di⁄er from the set up discussed
in Coenen, McAdam and Straub (2007). As we discussed earlier, we augment the original
model by separating overall public spending into public consumption and public investment.
The di⁄erence between these two components of public spending lies in the assumption
that public investment is productive, in the sense that it constitutes an important factor
in the production function of the individual private ￿rm. In contrast, spending on public
consumption a⁄ects aggregate demand without enhancing the productivity of the private
11
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utilizing as inputs homogenous private capital services, Kf;t, that are rent from the members
of household I in fully competitive markets, an index of di⁄erentiated labour services,
Nf;t, which combines household-speci￿c varieties of labour supplied in monopolistically
competitive markets, and public capital services GKt that a⁄ect the production of each
individual ￿rm in the same way. Public capital increases over time, if public investment
is larger than public capital￿ s depreciation rate and the associated investment adjustment
costs. We assume that the parametrization of the public investment adjustment costs
function and the rate of depreciation are equivalent to the one assumed in Coenen, McAdam
and Straub (2007) for the private sector.
The Lagrange multiplier MCf;t measures the shadow price of varying the use of capital
and labour services; that is, nominal marginal cost. We note that, since all ￿rms f face
the same input prices and since they all have access to the same production technology,











Relative to Coenen, McAdam and Straub (2007), non-tradable ￿nal public goods are
divided into two groups￿ a public consumption good QGC
t and a public investment good
QGI
t . It is assumed that the ￿nal public consumption good is a composite made only of
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Similarly, the non-tradable ￿nal public investment good QGI
t is assumed to be a com-
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Aggregating across the three ￿nal-good ￿rms, we obtain the following demand for do-


















Working Paper Series No 795
August 2007Market clearing condition implies that the supply of government consumption goods
QGC
t equals to the demand for government consumption goods GCt. A similar condition
equating QGI
t = GIt holds also for government investment. The budget constraint of the
￿scal authority will, therefore, distinguish between purchases of the ￿nal public consumption
good, GCt, and the ￿nal investment good GIt. In addition, the ￿scal authority makes
transfer payments TRt, issues bonds to ￿nance its debt, R￿1
t Bt+1￿Bt, earns seigniorage on
money holdings, Mt ￿ Mt￿1, and raises taxes with details on the latter given above. The
￿scal authority￿ s period-by-period budget constraint then has the following form:
PGC;t GCt + PGI;t GIt + TRt + Bt + Mt￿1
= ￿c















t (RK;t ut ￿ (￿u(ut) + ￿)PI;t )Kt + ￿d
t Dt + Tt + R￿1
t Bt+1 + Mt;
where all quantities are expressed in per-capita-terms, except for the labour services and
wages, which are di⁄erentiated across the members of the two households I and J.
The ￿scal authority￿ s purchases of the ￿nal public consumption good are speci￿ed as a
fraction of steady-state nominal output, gC
t = PGC;tGCt=PY Y , and are assumed to follow
a serially correlated process with mean gC,
gC
t = (1 ￿ ￿gC)gC + ￿gC gC
t￿1 + "gC;t:
In the same fashion, the ￿scal authority￿ s purchases of the ￿nal public investment good
are speci￿ed as a fraction of steady-state nominal output, gI
t = PGI;tGIt=PY Y , and are
assumed to follow a serially correlated process with mean gI,
gI
t = (1 ￿ ￿gI)gI + ￿gI gI
t￿1 + "gI;t:
The imposed market-clearing condition will also change to include both ￿nal public
goods, implying the following aggregate resource constraint:
PY;t Yt = PC;t (Ct + ￿v;t) + PI;t (It + ￿u(ut)Kt) + PGC;t GCt + PGI;t GIt


























t ;PIM;t are exports and imports of consumption and investment
and their corresponding prices indices. ￿v;t;￿u(ut);￿IMC are adjustment costs of transac-
tion, utilization and imports respectively, all de￿ned in the appendix. In the next section,
we describe the calibration of the model.
4.3 Calibration
In calibrating the NAWM, we follow the literature and ￿rst set key steady-state ratios, in-
cluding the ratios of the various nominal expenditure categories over nominal output, equal
to their empirical counterparts.9 For example, the ratios of public consumption to output
9The calibrated steady-state ratios are summarized in Table 1.
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of public investment to output in both countries are calibrated to 0.025 and 0.032. In this
context, given the NAWM￿ s two-country setup, it is su¢ cient to calibrate the respective
import-to-output ratios and the shares of imports in private consumption and investment
to obtain a consistent speci￿cation of the steady-state trade linkages. As regards the cal-
ibration of the money-to-consumption ratios, we imputed the fractions of the monetary
aggregate M1 held by the household sector over nominal consumption expenditure, which
amount to, respectively, 1.34 and 0.42 per quarter.10 Finally, the steady-state ratios of gov-
ernment debt over output are uniformly set equal to 2.40 per quarter, while the dividend
income-to-output ratios are assumed to be zero in steady state.
While the calibration of the steady-state ratios has been based on observed data, we
proceed by choosing the remaining structural parameters of the NAWM with the objective
of closely matching the pattern of the dynamic responses to a monetary policy shock as
implied by the estimated closed-economy model of the euro area by Smets and Wouters
(2003), henceforth referred to as SW (2003). Thus, broadly similar values are assigned to
those parameters that are common to both models.11 A notable exception is the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which is raised to a value of 2.00, compared with
a value of 1.35 in SW (2003). This modi￿cation helps to partly o⁄set the e⁄ects induced
by the ability of household I to borrow from abroad, which, unless dampened, would lead
to excess interest-rate sensitivity of consumption relative to investment.
In calibrating the behavior of the two types of households, we set the size of household J
equal to 0.25, in line with the estimates reported in Coenen and Straub (2005). The
parameters governing the wage-setting decisions on the part of the two types of households
are chosen symmetrically with both the degree of wage stickiness and the degree of wage
indexation ￿xed at a value of 0.75, in line with SW (2003). Similarly, the markup power
of the two households is assumed to be symmetric and equal to 20 percent, re￿ ecting a
uniform price elasticity of demand of 6.00 on the part of the intermediate-good producing
￿rms for di⁄erent varieties as well as for di⁄erent bundles of labour. Notwithstanding, the
pro￿le of wages and hours worked can di⁄er across the two types households because of
di⁄erences in the households￿marginal rate of substitution.
In the baseline calibration of the model the labor share of income is set at 70 percent,
the private capital share of income is calibrated at 28.5 percent, and the public capital share
of income is calibrated at 1.5 percent.
As regards parameters characterizing the pricing behavior of intermediate-good ￿rms
selling their di⁄erentiated outputs in domestic markets, we again assign values broadly
similar to those reported in SW (2003), with the degree of stickiness and the degree of
indexation set equal to 0.90 and 0.50, respectively. In contrast, the degree of stickiness in
the ￿rms￿pricing decision for the outputs sold in foreign markets is assumed to equal 0.30.
This guarantees that the terms of trade (de￿ned as the domestic import price relative to
the export price in domestic currency) are positively correlated with the real exchange rate,
as observed in the data. In this context, the price elasticity of demand for the di⁄erentiated
outputs is set equal to 6.00, implying a 20 percent markup over marginal cost in steady
state. The ￿xed cost in production is chosen to ensure zero pro￿ts in steady state, and the
10In calibrating the money-to-consumption ratios, we used data on currency in circulation and overnight
deposits held by households for the euro area over the period 1999-2004, while we adopted the calibration
by Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2005) for the United States.
11In our baseline calibration, we further assume that the structural parameters in the euro area and the
United States are fully symmetric.
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steady-state productivity level is normalized to unity.The remaining open-economy parameters are calibrated largely in line with the macro-
economic literature. Speci￿cally, the substitution elasticities between home and foreign
goods in forming the consumption and investment bundles are set equal to 1.50. Ulti-
mately, this implies a relative low sensitivity of domestic private absorption to changes in
the terms of trade. Similarly, we set the parameter governing the adjustment cost associated
with changing the import share in consumption equal to 5.00, thereby further dampening
the sensitivity of consumption to changes in the terms of trade. In contrast, adjusting the
import share in investment is assumed to be costless. This choice of adjustment cost parame-
ters, together with the calibration of the investment adjustment cost and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, proves particularly important for closely matching the dynamic
responses of consumption and investment to a monetary policy shock as implied by the
closed-economy model of SW (2003).
In calibrating the tax rates we use the data on the tax wedges reported in Coenen,
McAdam and Straub (2007). Also, in order to establish a more meaningful role of transfer
payments made by the ￿scal authority, we assume that transfers, in per-capita terms, are
unevenly distributed across the two types of households, favouring the members of house-
holds J over those of household I in the proportion of 3 to 1. This guarantees that the
level of consumption (hours worked) for a member of household J is not more than 25
(15) percent lower (higher) than that for a member of household I. In contrast, lump-sum
taxes, in per-capita terms, are assumed to be distributed in the proportion of 3 to 1 to the
detriment of household I. Both the public consumption and the public investment ratios
are assumed to follow serially correlated processes with an autoregressive coe¢ cient equal
to 0.90. Finally, in calibrating the ￿scal policy rule, we set the sensitivity of aggregate
lump-sum taxes with respect to the government debt-to-output ratio to 0.10.
Last but not least, for the monetary policy rule, we set the interest-rate response coe¢ -
cients on annual in￿ ation (in deviation from an in￿ ation target of 2 percent) and quarterly
output growth equal to 2.00 and 0.10, respectively, while the coe¢ cient on the lagged in-
terest rate is assumed to equal 0.95.12
5 Temporary Shocks to Public Spending
In this section, we are interested in uncovering the di⁄erences in the response of macro-
economic aggregates following both, temporary changes in public consumption and public
investment, and the corresponding short- and long-term spending multipliers. Although,
our main objective is to identify the macroeconomic e⁄ects of changes in the composition of
public spending that are presumingly permanent, the response of macroeconomic aggregates
following temporary shocks provide an intuitive starting point for our analysis. Further-
more, the literature is relatively scarce in comparing the macro e⁄ects of public investment
and public consumption shocks in a DSGE framework (see Perotti, 2004), so the following
discussion can also provide a useful benchmark for future analysis.
12The estimated interest-rate rule in SW (2003) prescribes a feedback of the nominal interest rate to the
quarterly in￿ ation rate and the output gap, as well as the ￿rst di⁄erence in these two target variables, with
the output gap being de￿ned in terms of the natural output level; that is, the output level that would prevail
in a version of the model without nominal rigidities.
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Figure 3 and 4 depict selected dynamic response functions following a temporary public
consumption shock equal to a one-percentage point increase in steady state output. All
dynamic responses are shown as percentage-point deviations from steady state.
The behavior of the impulse response functions following a public spending shock are
in line with our expectations. An increase in non-productive public spending, and the
corresponding expected increase in future taxes generate a negative wealth e⁄ect, inducing
unconstrained households to reduce consumption and increase labor supply on impact. On
the other hand, the rise in aggregate demand triggers an increase in labor demand and
real wages, allowing constrained households to increase their consumption on impact, and
preventing aggregate consumption from falling.
A central theme in the recent literature on the e⁄ects of government spending shock
has been indeed the ability of New-Keynesian DSGE models, augmented with a fraction of
liquidity-constrained households, to generate a crowding-in in private consumption. Gal￿
et. al. (2007) demonstrate that if a substantial fraction of households are choosing their
consumption path in a "rule-of-thumb" fashion, an increase in government spending can give
rise to higher private consumption. Coenen and Straub (2005) estimate, however, that the
share of "rule-of-thumb" households in the euro area is lower than the necessary threshold
identi￿ed in Gal￿ et al. (2007). As already suggested by Coenen, McAdam and Straub
(2007), however, the assumption that the unconstrained household can now borrow from
abroad provide another channel which mitigates the negative wealth e⁄ect of government
spending13. Indeed, imports rise strongly following a government spending shock. The rise
in imports is partly triggered by the signi￿cant improvement in the terms of trade which
induces protracted expenditure switching away from domestic towards foreign goods. Thus,
the negative wealth e⁄ect generated by the government spending shock is partly mitigated
by the substitution and wealth e⁄ect implied by the improvement in the terms of trade.
The behavior of the rest of the impulse response functions also accord well with intu-
ition. The increase in output following the government consumption shock and the induced
increase in both aggregate wage rate and the rental rate of capital feeds into an expansion of
marginal cost and in￿ ation. Monetary policy reacts to the build-up of in￿ ationary pressures
and output growth by raising the policy rate.
To evaluate rigorously the dynamic properties of alternative public spending the re-
sponses of output is suggestive but not enough. What really matters is the response of
output per unit of public spending, in other words, the multipliers of government spending.
Consequently, we calculate the public consumption multiplier14, presented in Table 2, at
di⁄erent points of time and ￿nd that the short-term public consumption multiplier is higher
than one, although it stabilizes at 0.81 in the long-term. These results mirror closely the
quantitative estimates, albeit not the dynamic path, of the government consumption multi-
pliers obtained by Perotti (2004), who conducts an empirical investigation of the e⁄ects of
government spending in ￿ve countries￿ the USA, Germany, England, Canada and Australia.
Perotti estimates that in all countries except the USA, the government consumption mul-
tiplier is always positive and quite similar across individual countries￿ the multiplier ranges
form 0.6 to 0.8 one year after the shock, increasing to 0.9 to 1.0 three years following the
13Of course, increasing the relative share of constrained agents will tilt the results in favor of a more
pronounced expansion of overall private consumption.
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and 1.3. In the case of the USA, the multiplier is about twice larger than the rest of the
countries at each time horizon.
5.2 Public Investment
Figure 3 and 4 also depicts the selected dynamic response functions to a temporary public
investment shock equal to a one-percentage point increase in steady-state output. Again,
all dynamic responses of variables are shown as percentage-point deviations from steady
state.
It is immediately seen that the introduction of public capital in the ￿rm￿ s production
function does change the dynamic pattern of the impulse response functions. The increase
in public investment yields a pronounced rise in public capital and this has important
qualitatively and quantitative implications for the behavior of the rest of the variables
in the model. Private consumption now increases immediately after the shock and stays
positive for a sustained period of time. The negative wealth e⁄ect is still operational for
the members of household I at the outset of the shock, but this e⁄ect wanes later on as
it is o⁄set by the increase in private ￿rms￿productivity associated with the expansion of
public capital. Similarly, while private investment and private capital fall initially just as
in the case of a government consumption shock, they expand in the long-term along with
the accumulation of public capital and the related increase in the production possibility
frontier.
The short-run public investment multiplier is analogous to the short-run public consump-
tion multiplier￿ it is greater than one. However, in the long-run, the government investment
multiplier grows substantially and reaches 2. This model-based ￿nding runs somewhat
counter to Perotti (2004), who ￿nds that although the public investment multiplier starts
out higher than the public consumption multiplier in the USA, Germany and Canada, it
subsequently declines in all countries except Australia. As a result, except in Germany,
the public investment multiplier is smaller than the public consumption multiplier at all
horizons after the initial impact15.
What is the economics behind these results and what accounts for the di⁄erential e⁄ects
of public consumption and public investment shocks? Broadly speaking, as government
consumption increases, the intertemporal government budget constraint dictates that taxes
must increase by the same amount, leading to a fall in private wealth and, consequently,
in the consumption of forward-looking economic agents. In contrast, public investment not
only increases aggregate demand, but it also raises aggregate supply by enhancing aggregate
production and the marginal productivity of labor and private capital. Intuitively, the public
investment shock renders the wealth e⁄ect less negative or even positive, if the productivity
of public capital is high enough. This leads to a smaller decrease or even increase in private
consumption. The same logic applies to private investment￿ as public capital builds up, the
productivity of private capital improves, causing a rise in private investment.
Furthermore, productive government spending has also a cost-alleviating e⁄ect result-
ing after a few periods in subdued response of marginal costs. In general, there are two
competing forces that in￿ uence marginal cost. First, the increased demand for labor and
15Note that we focus on the study by Perotti (2004) mainly because he claims that his empirical approach
is capable of doing away with a number of problem with existing approaches. However, there is a huge body
of empirical literature, including one that uses the production function aproach, which ￿nds signi￿cantly
positive e⁄ects of public investment on economic activity.
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shock to government spending will push up ￿rms￿marginal cost. However, the addition of
productive public investment in ￿rms￿production function implies that marginal cost will
increase less for any given increase in aggregate demand, as public investment will enter
with a negative sign in the equation for marginal cost16. This positive aggregate supply
e⁄ect may, therefore, reduce or, if strong enough, even overturn the aggregate demand ef-
fect. The impulse response functions for marginal cost re￿ ect these considerations. While
initially its response is quite similar following both shocks, the gradual build up of public
capital forces marginal cost to fall more than in the case of public consumption shock.
The cost alleviating e⁄ects of productive public investment are naturally re￿ ected in the
more muted response of in￿ ation and the nominal interest rate. The latter implies, given
the negative correlation between the real interest rate and consumption growth￿ to the
extent that higher in￿ ation leads to a higher real interest rate, that current consumption
must fall17. However, as productive public investment induces lower in￿ ation and a less
aggressive response of monetary authorities, the resulting rise in the real interest rate is
smaller as compared with the case of non-productive government spending. This mechanism
further ampli￿es the positive supply side e⁄ects of public investment shock, generating
higher private consumption, private investment, output, and public investment multipliers.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we consider the sensitivity of our results to changes in some model para-
meters of interest. We focus, thereby on the comparison of public consumption and public
investment multipliers. The results are reported in Table 2.
First, we test the sensitivity of our results to an increase in labor supply elasticity (the
inverse of ￿) from 0.5 to 2.5. There are several channels through an increase in labor supply
elasticity is a⁄ecting long run multipliers. First, the stronger response in labor supply
triggers a rise in the marginal product of capital, making investment more attractive for
unconstrained households. Accordingly, the stronger response in hours worked and capital
leads to a more pronounced rise in output, generating higher public spending multipliers in
both cases. Second, the increase in labour supply elasticity also has dampening e⁄ect on
the increase in real wages. While this e⁄ect has a negative impact on the consumption of
constrained households, it also has a cost-alleviating e⁄ect on the marginal cost of ￿rms.
The latter results in suppressed in￿ ationary pressures in the economy. The moderating
e⁄ect on in￿ ation￿ and the resulting less aggressive monetary policy stance￿ leads, through
its impact on unconstrained households, to higher private absorption and stronger spending
multipliers than in the baseline scenario.
Second, we exploit the abilities of the model to generate di⁄erent responses based on
the way transfers are distributed among households in the economy. In the baseline, we
assumed that transfers are disproportionately (with ratio 3 to 1) paid to household J. Here
we reverse somewhat this distributional pattern by assuming that now both household I
and household J receive equal payments by the ￿scal authorities. This scenario raises the
disposable income of household I and dampens the negative wealth e⁄ects of public spending
on their consumption. Consequently, the consumption of household I is higher than in the
baseline case. Of course, there is a countervailing e⁄ect on the consumption of household J
16In other words, productive public investment can ultimately be viewed and interpreted as a technology
shock to ￿rms￿production process.
17This assumes that the Taylor principle holds.
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to the limited ability of constrained agents to smooth consumption, the relative increase in
labor supply of constrained households is higher than the relative decrease of labor supply
of unconstrained households. Accordingly, this experiment is associated with higher public
spending multipliers compared to the baseline case.
Third, we study how the increase in asset market participation a⁄ects our results. To
this end, we calibrate the model by assuming that the share of non-Ricardian agents is
reduced from 25 to 10 percent. In line with the expectations, the average household in
the economy is becoming less prone to consume a certain fraction of its disposable income,
which enhances the negative wealth e⁄ect of public spending. The resulting lower private
absorption is re￿ ected in the smaller multipliers.
Finally, we explore the sensitivity of the multipliers to changes in the policy parame-
ters. In the forth experiment, we assume that the ￿scal authorities are more aggressive
in their response to public debt in the ￿scal rule. Accordingly, output reacts less strongly
to the positive aggregate demand shocks, resulting in smaller multipliers. Similarly, in the
￿fth scenario, more aggressive monetary policy reaction to in￿ ation raises the real interest
rate more than in the baseline case, further diminishing the consumption of household I
and private investment. The resulting smaller increase in output is also evidenced in the
multipliers.
6 What is the Impact of a Change in the Composition of
Public Spending?
In this section, we evaluate the possible implication of a change in the composition of public
spending on macroeconomic aggregates in the euro area. As we discussed in the previous
sections, the scenario is motivated by the gradual decline of public investment-to-GDP
ratio in the euro area, and the corresponding rise of the share of public consumption in
aggregate output. Consequently, in what follows, we investigate the macroeconomic impact
of a one percentage point increase in public consumption to GDP ratio together with a one
percentage point decline in the share of public investment-to-GDP, by holding the share
of overall public spending-to-GDP constant. In order to facilitate the intuition behind the
results, we also present the macroeconomic impact of separate, permanent changes in the
public consumption and public investment share of GDP.
6.1 Policy Scenario
We present the dynamic path of the selected macro variables in Figure 5 and 6, while the
public spending multipliers are depicted in Table 3.
Based on our DSGE model simulations, a change in the composition of public spending
in the euro area has a signi￿cant negative impact on economic activity. The results are
presented in Figure 5. The impact response of the public spending multiplier is around
-0.2 percent of steady-state output, while the long-run multiplier is around -0.74 percent.
Interestingly, while private investment is increasing on impact, the long-run response is
clearly negative in the long-run. Furthermore, we observe a signi￿cant and substantial
decrease in private consumption, while the initial fall in hours worked is followed by a
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in what follows the outcome of the two separate, individual permanent public spending
shocks in Figure 6. To ensure the comparison of the two individual public spending shocks,
we present in both cases, that is also in the case of public investment shock, the results
following a permanent one percentage point increase in public spending.18
In the scenario presented in Figure 6, a permanent, one percentage point permanent
increase in the public consumption to GDP ratio leads on impact to an increase of output
by 1.24 percentage points19. The main trigger of the output response is again the negative
wealth e⁄ect induced by the permanent increase in public spending. Obviously, as the
shock is permanent, the impact increase in labor supply, and the decrease in consumption
are substantial. Furthermore, the increase in labor supply has a permanent, negative e⁄ect
on real wages. Investment falls initially, but as the increase in labor supply has a positive
impact on the marginal product of capital, investment picks up and the long-run response
of investment becomes positive. Another interesting result is the u-shaped behavior of the
output multiplier following the shock shown in Table 3. This re￿ ects the negative response
of investment, and the sharp rise of hours worked on impact. As both private and public
capital are state variables, the increase in aggregate demand causes a sharp rise in hours
worked. Notice that due to habit persistence, the crowding-out e⁄ect of public spending on
private consumption is less pronounced on impact and the negative response of consumption
peaks after 2 years. Therefore, as the negative response of private consumption starts to
kick in, subdued aggregate demand is constraining the rise in hours worked (also re￿ ected
by the decline in real wages, although the initial impact is positive). As a result, the output
multiplier declines and starts to rise again when investment recovers.
Now turning to the response following a permanent, one-percentage point increase (de-
crease) in the public investment to GDP ratio, we observe a remarkable, 1.39 percentage
point increase (decrease) in output on impact. Notice that while the increase in public
investment pushes aggregate demand up in the economy, it also has a persistent, positive
impact on the marginal productivity of labor and private capital. The negative wealth e⁄ect
induced by the expected future tax increases has, as before, a negative impact on consump-
tion and a positive e⁄ect on labor supply. However, the increased productivity of labor has
a positive e⁄ect on labor demand, causing in equilibrium a persistent increase in real wages.
Interestingly, the impact response of investment is even more negative than in the case of
a public consumption. This can be explained by the fact that as public capital increases
on its transition to the new steady-state, the marginal productivity of private capital rises
steadily and gradually, inducing asset holders to postpone investment to the future. This
channel is absent following an increase in public consumption, leading private investment
fall less on impact, but increase more in the long run.
The latter can also explain the puzzling behavior of private investment following the
change in composition of public spending. Owing to the permanent decline in public invest-
ment, and the corresponding expected decrease in the marginal productivity in the future,
unconstrained households bring forward their investment, which leads to the substantial
increase of private investment in the short-run. In the long-run, however, the reduction of
the public investment has also a negative long-run impact on private investment.
To summarize, the previous results demonstrate that the observed change in composition
18Impulse response functions are approximately symmetric in our analysis, so a negative shock will change
the sign but not the magnitude of the response.
19Note that the long-run public consumption multiplier is above one following a permanent public con-
sumption shock as has already been demonstrated by Baxter and King (1993) in the neoclassical model.
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results are mainly triggered by the long-run decrease in marginal productivity owing to the
fall in public investment and through its corresponding e⁄ect on private investment and
real wages. Although the decline in public investment is partly mitigated by the rise in
public consumption, mainly through the positive e⁄ect of the latter on labor supply, a fall
in long-run output is nevertheless substantial and can reach about 0.74 percent of steady
state output. Furthermore, the results indicate, without providing a formal proof in what
follows, that as both, consumption and leisure decline, the change in the composition of
public spending is not welfare optimal.
7 Conclusion
Abstracting from distributional e⁄ects, there is a broad consensus between policy makers
in Europe that public investment is the superior type of spending instrument generally
available for the government. Nevertheless, data on public spending indicate a signi￿cant
and gradual decline in the public investment share of GDP in the recent years, while at
the same time in most countries, the public consumption share of GDP has increased or
has remained constant. Although, there is a substantial empirical literature that attempt
to identify the sources of these developments, there is still a lack of understanding of the
nature and the impact of a change in the composition of public spending. To shed some
light on these issues from a DSGE perspective, we examined the macroeconomic e⁄ects of
a change in composition of public spending using a modi￿ed version of the NAWM.
To facilitate the discussion, we also discussed the channels through public investment
a⁄ects macroeconomic aggregates, following both temporary and permanent shocks, and
demonstrated the di⁄erences to the impact of non-productive public consumption on real
activity.
The results indicate that the described changes in ￿scal stance can have a signi￿cant
long-run impact on economic activity. In particular, the long-run response of output, con-
sumption, and real wages are negative. We have further shown that, while investment might
experience a boom in the short-run, it will gradually decline in the long-run.
In this sense, the key message of the paper is that the calls for safeguarding public
investment in Europe are not without merit, and the recent change in the composition of
public spending is deleterious for long-run growth.
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Appendix A
In this appendix we provide the functional forms for the various adjustment and trans-
action costs included in the NAWM.
Transaction Cost Technology
We assume that the transaction cost technology is identical across both types of households
and takes the form




where ￿v;1;￿v;2 > 0 (cf. Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe, 2006).
Capital Utilisation Cost
As in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), the capital utilisation cost function takes
the form
￿u(ui;t) = ￿u;1 (ui;t ￿ 1) +
￿u;2
2
(ui;t ￿ 1)2; (2)
where ￿u;1;￿u;2 > 0.
Investment Adjustment Cost
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), we assume an investment adjustment










where ￿I > 0.
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August 2007Import Adjustment Cost
Adjusting the use of imports in the production of the ￿nal consumption good is subject to
















where ￿IMC > 0 and assuming that the representative ￿rm takes the previous period￿ s
(sector-wide) import share, IMC
t￿1=QC
t￿1, as given.
A similar speci￿cation holds for the use of imports in the production of the ￿nal invest-
ment good.
International Transaction Cost
Members of household I encounter an intermediation or ￿risk￿premium when they take a
position in the market for internationally traded bonds which depends on the per-capita
(net) foreign asset position of the domestic country relative to domestic output,
￿BF(BF











where ￿BF > 0. This speci￿cation implies that, in the non-stochastic steady state, domestic
household members have no incentive to hold internationally traded bonds and the net
foreign asset position is zero worldwide.
Appendix B: The New - Area Wide Model
The model consists of two symmetric countries of normalised population size s and
1 ￿ s, respectively: the euro area, denoted as the home country, and the United States,
representing the rest of the industrialised world and denoted as the foreign country. In each
country, there are four types of economic agents: households, ￿rms, a ￿scal authority, and
a monetary authority. We further distinguish between two households which di⁄er with
respect to their ability to access ￿nancial markets, with one household only holding money
as opposed to also trading bonds and accumulating physical capital. As regards ￿rms, we
distinguish between producers of tradable di⁄erentiated intermediate goods and producers
of three non-tradable ￿nal goods: a private consumption good, a private investment good,
and a public consumption good.
In the following, we outline the behaviour of the di⁄erent types of agents, characterise
the model￿ s aggregate outcomes and state the resource constraints which need to be satis￿ed
in equilibrium. We focus on the exposition of the home country, with the understanding
that the foreign country is similarly characterised. To the extent needed, foreign variables
and parameters are indexed with an asterisk, ￿ ￿￿ .20
Households
There are two households indexed by I and J. The members of household I are indexed
by i 2 [0; 1￿! ]. They have access to ￿nancial markets, where they buy and sell domestic
government bonds as well as internationally traded bonds, accumulate physical capital, the
20See Coenen, McAdam and Straub (2005) for a more detailed description of the model.
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August 2007services of which they rent out to ￿rms, and hold money for transaction purposes. This
enables the members of household I to smooth their consumption pro￿le in response to
shocks. The members of household J are indexed by j 2 (1 ￿ !; 1]. They cannot trade in
￿nancial and physical assets. Nevertheless, they can intertemporally smooth consumption
by adjusting their holdings of money. The members of both households supply di⁄erenti-
ated labour services and act as wage setters in monopolistically competitive markets. As a
consequence, they supply su¢ cient labour services to satisfy labour demand.21
Household I
Each member i of household I maximises its lifetime utility by choosing purchases of the
consumption good, Ci;t, purchases of the investment good, Ii;t, next period￿ s physical capital
stock, Ki;t+1, the intensity with which the existing capital stock is utilised, ui;t, next period￿ s
holdings of domestic government bonds as well as internationally traded bonds, Bi;t+1 and
BF


















where ￿ is the discount factor, ￿ denotes the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution and ￿ is the inverse of the elasticity of work e⁄ort with respect to the real
wage. The parameter ￿ measures the degree of external habit formation in consumption.
Thus, the utility of household member i depends positively on the di⁄erence between the
current level of individual consumption, Ci;t, and the lagged average consumption level of
household I as a whole, CI;t￿1, and negatively on individual labour supply, Ni;t.
Household member i faces the following period-by-period budget constraint:
(1 + ￿C
t + ￿v(vi;t))PC;t Ci;t + PI;t Ii;t (6)
+R￿1
t Bi;t+1 + ((1 ￿ ￿BF(BF
t ))RF;t)￿1St BF
i;t+1 + Mi;t + ￿i;t + ￿i;t
= (1 ￿ ￿N
t ￿ ￿
W h
t ) Wi;t Ni;t + (1 ￿ ￿K
t )(RK;t ui;t ￿ ￿u(ui;t)PI;t)Ki;t
+￿K
t ￿ PI;t Ki;t + (1 ￿ ￿D
t )Di;t + TRi;t ￿ Ti;t + Bi;t + St BF
i;t + Mi;t￿1;
where PC;t and PI;t are the prices of a unit of the private consumption good and the
investment good, respectively. Rt and RF;t denote, respectively, the risk-less returns on
domestic government bonds and internationally traded bonds. Internationally traded bonds
are denominated in foreign currency and, thus, their domestic value depends on the nominal
exchange rate St (expressed in terms of units of home currency per unit of foreign currency).
Ni;t denotes the labour services provided to ￿rms at wage rate Wi;t; RK;t indicates the rental
rate for the e⁄ective capital services rent to ￿rms, ui;t Ki;t, and Di;t are the dividends paid
by household-member-owned ￿rms.
The purchases of the consumption good are subject to a proportional transaction cost,
￿v(vi;t), which depends on consumption-based velocity, vi;t = (1 + ￿C
t )PC;tCi;t=Mi;t; that
is, the inverse of the household member￿ s money-to-consumption ratio. Similarly, ￿BF(BF
t )
represents a ￿nancial intermediation premium that the household member must pay when
taking a position in the international bond market. The incurred premium is rebated in a
21In case no distinction between the two households needs to be made, household members will occasionally
be indexed by h 2 [0; 1].
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August 2007lump-sum manner, being indicated by ￿i;t.22 As regards the provision of e⁄ective capital
services, varying the intensity of capital utilisation is subject to a proportional cost ￿u(ui;t).
The ￿scal authority absorbs part of the gross income of the household member to ￿nance
its expenditure. In this context, ￿C




t are the tax rates levied on the di⁄erent sources of household
income; that is, wage income Wi;t Ni;t, rental capital income RK;t Ki;t and dividend income
Di;t.23 Here, for simplicity, we assume that the utilisation cost of physical capital and
physical capital depreciation are exempted from taxation. ￿
W h
t is the additional pay-roll tax
rate levied on household wage income (representing the household member￿ s contribution
to social security). The terms TRi;t and Ti;t indicate transfers received and lump-sum taxes
paid, respectively.
Finally, it is assumed that household member i holds state-contingent securities, ￿i;t.
These securities are traded amongst members of household I and provide insurance against
individual wage-income risk. This guarantees that the marginal utility of consumption
out of wage income is identical across individual household members.24 As a result, all
household members will choose identical allocations in equilibrium.25
The capital stock owned by household member i evolves according to the following
capital accumulation equation,
Ki;t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Ki;t + (1 ￿ ￿I(Ii;t=Ii;t￿1))Ii;t; (7)
where ￿ is the depreciation rate and ￿I(Ii;t=Ii;t￿1) represents a generalised adjustment cost
formulated in terms of changes in investment.
Choice of Allocations
De￿ning as ￿i;t=PC;t and ￿i;t Qi;t the Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget con-
straint (6) and the capital accumulation equation (7), respectively, the ￿rst-order conditions
for maximising the household member￿ s lifetime utility function (5) with respect to Ci;t, Ii;t,
Ki;t+1, ui;t, Bi;t+1, BF













































22We assume that the members of the foreign household I
￿ are not subject to a ￿nancial intermediation
premium when trading in international bonds.
23For simplicity, it is assumed that dividends are taxed at the household level.
24The existence of state-contingent securities is assumed for analytical convenience and renders the model
tractable under staggered wage setting with household members supplying di⁄erentiated labour services.
25This in turn guarantees that Ci;t = CI;t in equilibrium.
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= 1 ￿ ￿0
v(vi;t)v2
i;t: (14)
Here, ￿i;t represents the shadow price of a unit of the consumption good expressed in terms
of consumption-based utility; that is, the marginal utility of consumption. Similarly, Qi;t
measures the shadow price of a unit of the investment good; that is, Tobin￿ s Q.26
Combining the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to the holdings of domestic and in-
ternationally traded bonds, (12) and (13), yields a risk-adjusted uncovered-interest-parity
condition, re￿ ecting that the return on internationally traded bonds is subject to a ￿nancial
intermediation premium.
Wage Setting
The members of household I act as wage setters for their di⁄erentiated labour services Ni;t
in monopolistically competitive markets. We assume that the wages for the di⁄erentiated
labour services, Wi;t, are determined by staggered nominal wage contracts ￿ la Calvo (1983).
Thus, household members receive permission to optimally reset their nominal wage contract
in a given period t with probability 1 ￿ ￿I. All household members that receive such
permission choose the same wage rate ~ WI;t = ~ Wi;t. Those members that do not receive









that is, the wage contract is indexed to a geometric average of past changes in the price of
the private consumption good, PC;t, and the steady-state consumer-price in￿ ation rate, ￿C,
where ￿I is an indexation parameter.
The members of household I that receive permission to optimally reset their wage con-
tracts in period t are assumed to maximise lifetime utility, as represented by equation (5),
taking into account the indexation scheme (15) and the demand for their labour services
(the formal derivation of which we postpone until we consider the ￿rms￿problem).






























26Notice that the ￿rst-order condition (11) implies that the intensity of capital utilisation is identical
across household members; that is, ui;t = ut.
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optimised, the latter are set so as to equate the household members￿discounted sum of
expected after-tax marginal revenues, expressed in consumption-based utility terms, ￿i;t+k,
to the discounted sum of expected marginal cost, expressed in terms of marginal disutility of
labour, ￿i;t+k = ￿N
￿
i;t+k. In the absence of wage staggering (￿I = 0), the factor ￿I=(￿I ￿1)
represents the markup of the real after-tax wage over the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure,27 re￿ ecting the degree of monopoly power on the part of













Notice that the wage markup drives an additional wedge between the e⁄ective consump-
tion wage and the marginal rate of substitution. Obviously, the distortions arising from the
markup wedge ￿I=(￿I ￿ 1) and the tax wedge 1 ￿ ￿N
t ￿ tW h are isomorphic.
Household J
The members of household J do not have access to capital and bond markets. Nevertheless,
they can intertemporally smooth consumption by adjusting their holdings of money. Thus,
using self-explanatory notation, the members of household J optimally choose purchases of
the consumption good Cj;t and holdings of money Mj;t by maximising their lifetime utility
function, which is assumed to be symmetric to that of the members of household I, subject
to the following period-by-period budget constraint:
(1 + ￿C
t + ￿v(vj;t))PC;t Cj;t + Mj;t (18)
= (1 ￿ ￿N
t ￿ ￿
W h
t ) Wj;t Nj;t + TRj;t ￿ Tj;t + Mj;t￿1 + ￿j;t
with the transaction cost ￿v(vj;t) depending on consumption-based velocity; that is, the
inverse of the household members￿money-to-consumption ratio.
De￿ning ￿j;t=PC;t as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint (18),
the ￿rst-order conditions for maximising the household members￿lifetime utility with re-














= 1 ￿ ￿0
v(vj;t)v2
j;t; (20)
where ￿j;t represents the shadow price of a unit of the consumption good for household
member j.
The members of household J act as wage-setters for their di⁄erentiated labour services
in a manner analogous to the behaviour of the members of household I. Hence, we obtain a
￿rst-order condition for their optimal wage-setting decision similar to that for the members
of household I.
27The markup depends on the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the di⁄erentiated labour
services supplied by the members of household I, which in turn determines the ￿rms￿price elasticity of
demand for these services.
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There are two types of ￿rms. A continuum of monopolistically competitive ￿rms indexed
by f 2 [0;1], each of which produces a single tradable di⁄erentiated intermediate good,
Yf;t, and a set of three representative ￿rms, which combine the purchases of domestically-
produced intermediate goods with purchases of imported intermediate goods into three
distinct non-tradable ￿nal goods, namely a private consumption good, QC
t , a private in-
vestment good, QI
t, and a public consumption good, QG
t .
Intermediate-Good Firms






f;t ￿  ; 0
i
; (21)
utilising as inputs homogenous capital services, Kf;t, that are rented from the members of
household I in fully competitive markets, and an index of di⁄erentiated labour services,
Nf;t, which combines household-speci￿c varieties of labour supplied in monopolistically
competitive markets. The variable zt represents (total-factor) productivity which is assumed
to be identical across ￿rms and which evolves over time according to an exogenous serially
correlated process, ln(zt) = (1￿￿z)z+￿z ln(zt￿1)+"z;t, where z determines the steady-state
level of productivity. The parameter   represents the ￿xed cost of production.28
Capital and Labour Inputs
Taking the rental cost of capital RK;t and the aggregate wage index Wt (to be derived
below) as given, the ￿rm￿ s optimal demand for capital and labour services must solve
the problem of minimising total input cost RK;t Kf;t + (1 + ￿
W f
t )Wt Nf;t subject to the
technology constraint (21). Here, ￿
W f
t denotes the payroll tax rate levied on wage payments
(representing the ￿rm￿ s contribution to social security).
De￿ning as MCf;t the Lagrange multiplier associated with the technology constraint
(21), the ￿rst-order conditions of the ￿rm￿ s cost minimisation problem with respect to
capital and labour inputs are given, respectively, by ￿(Yf;t +  )=Kf;t MCf;t = RK;t and
(1 ￿ ￿)(Yf;t +  )=Nf;t MCf;t = (1 + ￿
W f
t )Wt, with the payroll tax rate ￿
W f
t introducing a
wedge between the ￿rm￿ s e⁄ective labour cost and the marginal revenue of labour.
The Lagrange multiplier MCf;t measures the shadow price of varying the use of capital
and labour services; that is, nominal marginal cost. We note that, since all ￿rms f face
the same input prices and since they all have access to the same production technology,
nominal marginal cost MCf;t are identical across ￿rms; that is, MCf;t = MCt with
MCt =
1
zt ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)1￿￿ (RK;t)￿((1 + ￿
W f
t )Wt)1￿￿: (22)
The labour input used by ￿rm f in producing its di⁄erentiated output, Nf;t, is assumed
to be a composite of two household-speci￿c bundles of labour services, NI
f;t and NJ
f;t which
combine the di⁄erentiated labour services of the individual members of the two households
28The ￿xed cost of production will be chosen to ensure zero pro￿ts in steady state. This in turn guarantees
that there is no incentive for other ￿rms to enter the market in the long run.
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where the parameter ￿ > 1 denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the




f;t the use of the di⁄erentiated labour services supplied by house-



































where ￿I;￿J > 1 are the intratemporal elasticities of substitution between the di⁄erentiated
labour services of the members of household I and household J, respectively.
With nominal wage contracts for di⁄erentiated labour services i and j being set in
monopolistically competitive markets, ￿rm f takes wages Wi;t and Wj;t as given and chooses
the optimal input of each labour variety i and j by minimising the cost of forming the
household-speci￿c labour bundles subject to the aggregation constraints (24). This yields





















where WI;t and WJ;t are the associated nominal wage indexes.
Next, taking the wage indexes WI;t and WJ;t as given, the ￿rm chooses the combination
of the household-speci￿c labour bundles NI
f;t and NJ
f;t that minimise WI;t NI
f;t + WJ;t NJ
f;t
subject to aggregation constraint (23). This yields the following demand functions for the
household-speci￿c labour bundles:
NI












where Wt is the associated aggregate nominal wage index, which has the property that
the minimum cost of using the composite labour index Nf;t as an input in producing the
di⁄erentiated intermediate output Yf;t is given by Wt Nf;t.
Aggregating across the continuum of intermediate-good ￿rms f, we obtain the following































Each ￿rm f sells its di⁄erentiated output Yf;t in both domestic and foreign markets under
monopolistic competition. We assume, as in Betts and Devereux (1996), that the ￿rm
charges di⁄erent prices at home and abroad, pricing in local currency. In both markets, there
is sluggish price adjustment due to staggered price contracts ￿ la Calvo (1983). Accordingly,
29In principle, the two household-speci￿c bundles of labour services could be distinguished by di⁄erences
in skill levels across households, resulting in a larger dispersion of wage income which may ultimately provide
a rationale for the existence of liquidity constraints on the part of the low-income household.
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August 2007￿rm f receives permission to optimally reset prices in a given period t either with probability
1 ￿ ￿H or with probability 1 ￿ ￿X, depending on whether the ￿rm sells its di⁄erentiated
output in the domestic or the foreign market.
De￿ning as PH;f;t the domestic price of good f and as PX;f;t its foreign price denominated
in foreign currency, all ￿rms that receive permission to reset their price contracts in a given
period t choose the same price ~ PH;t = ~ PH;f;t and ~ PX;t = ~ PX;f;t, depending on the market of
destination. Those ￿rms which do not receive permission are allowed to adjust their prices
















that is, the price contracts are indexed to a geometric average of past changes in the
aggregate price indexes, PH;t and PX;t, and the steady-state in￿ ation rates, ￿H and ￿X,
where ￿H and ￿X are indexation parameters.
Each ￿rm f receiving permission to optimally reset its domestic and/or foreign price in













subject to the price-indexation schemes (28) and taking as given domestic and foreign
demand for its di⁄erentiated output, Hf;t and Xf;t (to be derived below).
Here, ￿I;t;t+k is the ￿rm￿ s discount rate de￿ned as the average stochastic discount factor
of the members of household I that own the ￿rm, while DH;f;t = PH;f;t Hf;t￿MCt Hf;t and
DX;f;t = St PX;f;t Xf;t ￿ MCt Xf;t are period-t nominal pro￿ts (net of ￿xed cost) yielded
in domestic and foreign markets, respectively, which are distributed as dividends to the
members of household I.
Hence, we obtain the following ￿rst-order condition characterising the ￿rm￿ s optimal























This expression states that in those intermediate-good markets in which price contracts
are re-optimised, the latter are set so as to equate the ￿rms￿discounted sum of expected
revenues to the discounted sum of expected marginal cost. In the absence of price staggering
(￿H = 0), the factor ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) represents the markup of the price charged in domestic
markets over nominal marginal cost, re￿ ecting the degree of monopoly power on the part
of the intermediate-good ￿rms.30
We obtain a similar ￿rst-order condition characterising the ￿rm￿ s optimal pricing deci-
sion for its output sold in the foreign market.
30The markup depends on the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the di⁄erentiated goods
supplied by the intermediate-good ￿rms to the domestic ￿nal-good ￿rms, which in turn determines the
￿nal-good ￿rms￿price elasticity of demand for the di⁄erentiated intermediate goods.
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The representative ￿rm producing the non-tradable ￿nal private consumption good, QC
t ,
combines purchases of a bundle of domestically-produced intermediate goods, HC
t , with
purchases of a bundle of imported foreign intermediate goods, IMC


























where the parameter ￿C > 1 denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
the distinct bundles of domestic and foreign intermediate goods, while ￿C measures the
home bias in the production of the consumption good.
Notice that the consumption-good ￿rm incurs a cost, ￿IMC(IMC
t =QC
t ), when varying
the use of the bundle of imported intermediate goods in producing the consumption good.
As a result, the import share is relatively unresponsive in the short run to changes in the
relative price of imported goods, while the level of imports is permitted to jump in response
to changes in overall demand.31
De￿ning as HC
f;t and IMC
f￿;t the use of the intermediate goods produced by the domestic
























where ￿; ￿￿ > 1 are the intratemporal elasticities of substitution between the di⁄erentiated
intermediate goods produced domestically and abroad.
With nominal prices for di⁄erentiated intermediate goods f and f￿ being set in mono-
polistically competitive markets, the consumption-good ￿rm takes prices PH;f;t and PIM;f￿;t
as given and chooses the optimal use of each di⁄erentiated intermediate good f and f￿
by minimising the expenditure for the bundles of domestic and foreign intermediate goods
subject to the aggregation constraints (32). This yields the following demand functions for
















where PH;t and PIM;t are the aggregate price indexes for the bundles of domestic and foreign
intermediate goods, respectively.
Next, taking the price indexes PH;t and PIM;t as given, the consumption-good ￿rm
chooses the combination of the domestic and foreign intermediate-good bundles HC
t and
IMC
t that minimises PH;t HC
t + PIM;t IMC
t subject to aggregation constraint (31). This

























31While our treatment of the adjustment cost as being external to the ￿rm would formally involve assuming
the existence of a large number of ￿rms with appropriate adjustments in notation (see, e.g., Bayoumi, Laxton
and Pesenti, 2004), we abstract from these adjustments for ease of exposition.
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is the price of a unit of the private consumption good and ￿
y








The representative ￿rm producing the non-tradable ￿nal private investment good, QI
t,
is modelled in an analogous manner. Speci￿cally, the investment-good ￿rm combines its
purchase of a bundle of domestically-produced intermediate goods, HI
t , with the purchase
of a bundle of imported foreign intermediate goods, IMI


























where the parameter ￿I > 1 denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between
the distinct bundles of domestic and foreign intermediate inputs, while ￿I measures the
home bias in the production of the investment good.
All other variables related to the production of the investment good ￿import adjust-
ment cost, ￿IMI;t(IMI
t =QI
t); the optimal demand for ￿rm-speci￿c and bundled domestic and




t , respectively; as well as the price of
a unit of the investment good, PI;t ￿are de￿ned or derived in a manner analogous to that
for the consumption good.32
In contrast, the non-tradable ￿nal public consumption good QG
t is assumed to be a
composite made only of domestic intermediate goods; that is, QG
t = HG
t . Hence, the optimal
demand for each domestic intermediate good f is given by HG
f;t = (PH;f;t=PH;t )
￿￿ HG
t and
the price of a unit of the public consumption good is PG;t = PH;t.
Aggregating across the three ￿nal-good ￿rms, we obtain the following demand for do-


















where Ht = HC
t + HI
t + HG
t and IMt = IMC
t + IMI
t .
The purchase of the imported intermediate good f￿ corresponds to the di⁄erentiated
output sold in the home market by the foreign intermediate-good producer f￿; that is,
sIMf￿;t = (1 ￿ s)X￿
f￿;t, taking into account di⁄erences in country size. Similarly, with
intermediate-good ￿rms setting prices in terms of local currency, the price of the interme-
diate good imported from abroad (the import price index of the home country) is equal to
the price charged by the foreign producer in the home country (the export price index of
the foreign country); that is, PIM;f￿;t = P￿
X;f￿;t (PIM;t = P￿
X;t).
32Notice that even in the absence of import adjustment cost, the prices of the consumption and investment
goods may di⁄er due to di⁄erences in the import content.
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The ￿scal authority purchases the ￿nal public consumption good, Gt, makes transfer pay-
ments, TRt, issues bonds to re￿nance its debt, Bt, earns seignorage on outstanding money
holdings, Mt￿1, and raises taxes with details on the latter given above. The ￿scal authority￿ s
period-by-period budget constraint then has the following form:
PG;t Gt + TRt + Bt + Mt￿1 (39)
= ￿C















t (RK;t ut ￿ (￿u(ut) + ￿)PI;t )Kt + ￿D
t Dt + Tt + R￿1
t Bt+1 + Mt;
where all quantities are expressed in per-capita-terms (de￿ned below), except for the labour
services and wages, which are di⁄erentiated across the members of the two households.
The ￿scal authority￿ s purchases of the ￿nal public consumption good are speci￿ed as
a fraction of steady-state nominal output, gt = PG;t Gt=PY Y , and are assumed to follow
a serially correlated process with gt = (1 ￿ ￿g)g + ￿g gt￿1 + "g;t. Similarly, transfers as a
fraction of steady-state nominal output, trt = TRt=PY Y , are assumed to evolve according
to trt = (1 ￿ ￿tr)tr + ￿tr trt￿1 + "tr;t.
Distortionary tax rates ￿X
t with X = C; D; K; N; Wh and Wf are assumed to be ex-
ogenously set by the ￿scal authority and are constant, ￿X
t = ￿X, unless otherwise stated.
The ￿scal rule applied in the paper, which ensures equilibrium determinacy of the model is
described in the main text.
The monetary authority is assumed to follow a Taylor-type interest-rate rule (cf. Taylor,
1993) speci￿ed in terms of annual consumer-price in￿ ation and quarterly output growth,
R4
t = ￿R R4















where R4 = ￿￿4 ￿ is the equilibrium nominal interest rate, ￿ denotes the monetary author-
ity￿ s in￿ ation target and gY is the (gross) rate of output growth in steady state (assumed
to equal one). The term "R;t represents a serially uncorrelated monetary policy shock.
Aggregation and Aggregate Resource Constraint
The model is closed by imposing market-clearing conditions, formulating the aggregate




Except for labour services Nh;t, which are di⁄erentiated across households members, the
aggregate quantity, expressed in per-capita terms, of any household member-speci￿c variable
Xh;t is given by Xt =
R 1
0 Xh;t dh = (1 ￿ !)Xi;t + ! Xj;t, as all members of each household
choose identical allocations in equilibrium.
Aggregate Wage Dynamics
With the members of household I setting their wage contracts Wi;t according to equation
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August 2007(15) and equation (16), respectively, the wage index WI;t evolves according to
WI;t =
 












A similar relationship holds for the index of the wage contracts set by the members of
household J; that is, WJ;t.
Aggregate Price Dynamics
With intermediate-good ￿rms f setting their price contracts for the di⁄erentiated products
sold domestically, PH;f;t, according to equation (28) and equation (30), respectively, the
aggregate price index PH;t evolves according to
PH;t =
 











A similar relationship holds for the aggregate index of price contracts set for the di⁄er-
entiated products sold abroad, PX;t.
Aggregate Resource Constraint and Net Foreign Assets
Imposing market-clearing conditions33 implies the following aggregate resource constraint:



























0 ￿v(vi;t)Ci;t di +
R 1
1￿! ￿v(vj;t)Cj;t dj measures the aggregate transaction
costs of households.
The domestic holdings of internationally traded bonds (that is, the home country￿ s (net)








where TBt = St PX;t Xt ￿ PIM;t IMt is the home country￿ s trade balance, and ToTt =
PIM;t=St PX;t denotes the domestic terms of trade.
33See Coenen, McAdam and Straub (2005) for details.
34Notice that the existence of a ￿nancial intermediation premium guarantees that, in the non-stochastic
steady state, holdings of internationally traded bonds are zero worldwide.
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Average for EU-12 countries 
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(In percent of GDP)
Note: Public investment is computed as government fixed capital formation  from the OECD database.
1/ Unweighted average for Austria, Belgium, Greece, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain.
2/ Data for Portugal is available only from 1990.
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Figure 2. Public Consumption in EU-12 and United States, 1970-2005
(In percent of GDP)
Note: Public consumption is computed as government final consumption expenditure from the OECD database.
1/ Unweighted average for Austria, Belgium, Greece, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain.
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Public Consumption Shock
Public Investment Shock
Figure 3. Dynamic Responses to Transitory Public Consumption and Public 
Investment Shocks
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: For the baseline version of the model, this figure depicts the dynamic responses of selected variables to persistent governmen
investment and government consumption shocks equal to an one-percent increase in steady-state output. All dynamic responses are















































0 1 53 04 5
Public Consumption Shock
Public Investment Shock
Figure 4. Dynamic Responses to Transitory Public Consumption and Public 
Investment Shocks
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: For the baseline version of the model, this figure depicts the dynamic responses of selected variables to persistent governmen
investment and government consumption shocks equal to an one-percent increase in steady-state output. All dynamic responses are
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Figure 5. Dynamic Responses to Joint Permanent Public Consumption and Public 
Investment Shocks
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: For the baseline version of the model, this figure depicts the dynamic responses of selected variables to joint permanent governmen
investment and government consumotion shocks equal to an one-percent increase in steady-state output. All dynamic responses are
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Figure 6. Dynamic Responses to Permanent Public Consumption and Public 
Investment Shocks
Source: Authors' calculations.
Note: For the baseline version of the model, this figure depicts the dynamic responses of selected variables to permanent governmen
investment and government consumption shocks equal to an one-percent increase in steady-state output. All dynamic responses are
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August 2007Euro Area USA
0.60 0.62 Private consumption-to-output ratio
0.22 0.22 Private investment-to-output ratio
0.155 0.128 Public consumption-to-output ratio
0.025 0.032 Public investment-to-output ratio
0.18 0.13 Imports-to-output ratio
0.05 0.06     Private consumption good
0.13 0.07     Private investment good
1.34 0.42 Money-to-consumption ratio
2.40 2.40 Government debt-to-output ratio
0.00 0.00 Divident income-to-output ratio
Note: This table reports the steady-state ratios of the main expenditure categories over
nominal output, as obtained from the national accounts. The money-to-consumption ratios
are computed as the ratios of the narrow monetary agregate M1 held by the household 
sector over nominal consumption expenditure. The ratio for the euro area has been calibrated 
using monetary data for the 1999-2004 period, while the ratio for the United States is taken
from Scmidt-Grohe and Uribe (2005).
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August 2007A. Baseline
248 2 0
1.058 1.010 0.940 0.810
1.072 1.036 0.990 0.960
B. Labor Supply Elasticity equal to 2.5 (0.5 in baseline)
248 2 0
1.068 1.030 0.990 0.950
1.073 1.037 0.993 0.966
C. Equal Transfer Distribution (in baseline 3 to 1 in favor of H/H J)
248 2 0
1.059 1.012 0.944 0.821
1.073 1.037 0.992 0.968
D. Share of Households J equal to 0.1 (0.25 in baseline)
248 2 0
1.048 0.995 0.926 0.800
1.063 1.022 0.976 0.950
E. More Aggressive Fiscal Rule
248 2 0
1.052 1.000 0.929 0.805
1.066 1.026 0.978 0.951
F. More Aggressive Monetary Rule
248 2 0
1.034 0.972 0.891 0.760







Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis of the Public Consumption and Public Investment 
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August 2007A. Baseline
248 2 0
1.239 1.066 0.924 0.973
1.393 1.236 1.055 1.102
B. Policy Scenario
248 2 0
-0.214 -0.229 -0.166 -0.128
Table 3: Public Consumption and Public Investment Multipliers                    
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